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We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken 
before the realization of private signals. Using the general model developed by Raith (1996), 
we show that if firms are allowed to make bilateral exclusive sharing agreements, then some 
degree of information sharing is consistent with equilibrium, and is a constant feature of 
equilibrium when the number of firms is not too small. Our result is to be contrasted with the 
traditional conclusion that no information is shared in common values situations with strategic 
substitutes - such as Cournot competition with demand shocks - when firms can only make 
industry-wide sharing contracts (e.g., a trade association). 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The incentives of oligopolistic ﬁrms to share private information when facing an uncertain
environment have been the object of a large literature, pioneered by the works of Novshek and
Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), Vives (1985) and Gal-or (1985)). Such incentives have
turned out to vary across the various models of oligopolistic competition, and to delicately
depend on speciﬁc assumptions, making the construction of a general theory problematic.
The general model proposed by Raith (1996) has shown, however, that such diﬀerences
can be basically imputed to the nature of the private information held by ﬁrms (which can
be of the common value or private value type and can have various degrees of precision) and
to the type of strategic interaction on the market (where strategies can be complements or
substitutes).
In terms of economic policy, understanding the incentives to share information is of crucial
importance. When no such incentives exist, any evidence of information sharing should be
interpreted as evidence of collusion, with obvious implication for social welfare. This has in
fact been the line followed by K¨ uhn and Vives (1995) in their study of the EU industry.
A ss h o w ni ns e v e r a lw o r k so nt h i st o p i ca n de ﬀectively summarized by Raith (1996), the
absence of information is a typical feature of common value problems in which strategies are
substitutes (therefore including the standard Cournot model). This result has been obtained
in various forms and in two diﬀerent models of information transmission.
The ”strategic” model studies a simultaneous game of information revelation, in which
ﬁrms decide whether to disclose or to withhold information. In this model, the decision to
withhold one’s own information does not aﬀect the acquisition of the private information
disclosed by other ﬁrms. Withholding information is the unique dominant strategy of this
game in all common value situations with strategic substitutes. In contrast, when private
information is not correlated across ﬁrms (private value) or, even if correlated, contains no
noise (perfect signals), revealing information is always a dominant strategy (see Raith, 1996).
In the ”contractual” model, sharing contracts are ”exclusive”, by this meaning that ﬁrms
exchange information on a quid pro quo basis (see Clarke, 1983 and Kirby, 1988). Here, all
ﬁrms that do not reveal their private information are excluded from the information revealed
by other ﬁrms. This model has lent itself to the analysis of a simple mechanisms (e.g., an
industry-wide trade association) which universally discloses information if and only if all ﬁrms
have chosen to disclose, otherwise no information is shared. Information sharing takes place
2in equilibrium when the expected proﬁts of ﬁrms are higher than when using only their own
private signal. As shown in Raith (1996), under common value and strategic substitutes ﬁrms
prefer the complete absence of information to an industry-wide sharing contract, as long as
products diﬀerentiation is not too high.1
In this paper we will study a diﬀerent contractual model, in which ﬁrms share informa-
tion on the basis of exclusive bilateral contracts. Information sharing is therefore no longer
mediated by a centralized industry-wide agency, but goes through private arrangements of
entrepreneurs. The restriction to bilateral contracts does not, in principle, rule out equilib-
ria in which information sharing groups arise, and allows for the emergence of other, more
complex, information structures, that can be usefully thought of as a network of sharing
agreements.
We deﬁne a pairwise stable information structure as a set of sharing agreements with the
property that no new agreement is formed and no existing one is severed.2 Our main result is
c o n t a i n e di np r o p o s i t i o n1a n dr e f e r st oc o m m o n value situations. We show that the absence
of information sharing (the empty network in the present context) is never a pairwise stable
structure, even when strategies are substitutes and products are homogeneous (the standard
Cournot game). For those situations in which complete information pooling (the complete
network) is Pareto dominated by the absence of information sharing, this result is obtained
under the additional condition that the number of ﬁrms in the market is not too small.
The intuition underlying this result is quite simple. Consider the decision of two ﬁrms, say
i and j, to share their private information when no other ﬁrm is in the market. This decision
has two distinct eﬀects on the expected proﬁts of, say, ﬁrm i.T h eﬁr s t( p o s i t i v e )e ﬀect stems
from the reﬁnement of i’s expectation the state of the world and from the observation of
´ j’s signal; the second (negative) eﬀect stems from the revelation of i’s signal to ﬁrm j.A s
discussed above, the net eﬀect is negative as long as products are not too diﬀerentiated (see
Raith, 1996).
Suppose now that other ﬁrms are in the market. Now, the information shared by i and j
1For the standard Cournot game with homogeneous goods, Kirby (1988) has also looked at a diﬀerent
contract, in which ﬁrms can decide to infringe the contract, expecting all other ﬁr m st ok e e ps h a r i n gt h e i ro w n
information. He ﬁnds that the industry-wide agreement is stable whenever it Pareto dominates the absence
of information sharing. The same type of contract was considered in Vives (1990) for the case of monopolistic
competition.
2The concept of pairwise stability, adapted here to information structures, has been deﬁned for general
network problems by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
3has the additional eﬀect of reﬁning both i’s and j’s expectation on the private information
held by the other ﬁrms (and, thereby, on their equilibrium behavior). This reﬁnement is
due to the correlation of ﬁrms signals, and has a positive eﬀect on both i’s and j’s expected
proﬁts. Note also that this additional information is acquired by i and j without revealing
to the other ﬁrms any information about i’s and j’s signals (in this sense, at no cost).
The magnitude of this second eﬀect clearly increases with the number of ﬁrms in the
market, from which the requirement of proposition 1 on the number of competitors. It
must be pointed out, however, that the presence of information sharing in equilibrium can
be compatible with the minimal number of ﬁrms (three) for which the additional eﬀect
underlying our proposition is generated. This is shown by means of an example in proposition
2.
Proposition 2 also shows that the positive relation between the beneﬁts from information
sharing and the number of unobserved ﬁrms can generate incomplete stable information
structure, in which a group of ﬁrms agree to share information, excluding the other ﬁrms
from the agreement. Proposition 3 shows, however, that such incomplete structures are
never the unique stable networks, since the complete network, in which complete pooling of
information occurs, is always pairwise stable.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Raith model on information sharing,
and a few new concepts and deﬁnitions due to the presence of bilateral agreements. Section
3 presents the main results, contained in propositions 1, 2 and 3; section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a stochastic oligopoly model with n ﬁrms, in which the state of the world
τ =( τ1,τ 2,...,τ n) represents deviations from the means of either the marginal costs or the
intercept of the demand function of each ﬁrm i.E a c h τi is a random variable distributed
normally, with zero mean, variance ts and covariance tn ≥ 0.
Each ﬁrm i receives a private noisy signal yi about the state of the world τi,w i t hyi =
τi +ηi,w h e r et h en o i s eηi is normally distributed with zero mean, variance u and covariance
un ≥ 0. Raith (1996) deﬁnes three classes of situations with respect to information: ”common
value” when tn = ts, ”independent values” when tn = un = 0 and ”perfect signals” when
u =0 .
Firms may observe other ﬁrms’ signals as a result of information sharing agreements.
4We assume that such agreements are bilateral and exclusive; this means that ﬁrm i is not
allowed to observe ﬁrm j’s signal unless it reveals its own signal to ﬁrm j.W ed on o tr e q u i r e
transitivity in sharing agreements, in the sense that information sharing between ﬁrms i and
j and between ﬁrms j and k need not imply information sharing between ﬁrms i and k.
Formally, an ”information structure” is given by a non directed network g,i nw h i c he a c h
link ij denotes a bilateral information sharing agreement between ﬁrms i and j.W ed e n o t e
by gi ≡ {j : ij ∈ g} ∪ {i} the set of neighbours of i in g. The information available to ﬁrm
i in the information structure g is therefore Ii(g) ≡ {yj : j ∈ gi}. We will use the notation
g + ij to denote the network obtained by adding to g the link ij / ∈ g,a n dg − ij to denote
the network obtained by severing the link ij ∈ g from g.
Following Raith (1996), we formulate ﬁrm i’s proﬁt in a general manner, without referring
to a speciﬁci n t e r p r e t a t i o no fτ. We restrict our attention to the case of Cournot competition,




(βn − εsi)sj +( β + γsτi − δsi)si. (1)






the degree of products diﬀerentiation. When γs = 1 we have demand uncertainty, while when
γs = −1 we have cost uncertainty.
With each possible information structure g we associate the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
of the Cournot game in which each ﬁrm i sets its quantity si in order to maximize its proﬁta s
given by (1), given its available information as this is determined by i’s links in g.F o r m a l l y ,
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium associated with g is a vector s∗ such that for each ﬁrm i, s∗
i
solves the following problem:
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Standard results (see Radner, 1962 and Proposition 3.1 in Raith (1996)) can be used to
establish the existence of a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for all information structures
5g. Firms’ Bayesian equilibrium strategies are aﬃne in the observed signals:
s∗
i = ai +
X
j∈Ii(g)
bijsj,i =1 ,2,...n. (4)
The ai and bij coeﬃcients can be computed by solving the following system, which im-
























































3 describe the way in which ﬁrms use their observed signals
to update their beliefs. In particular, Ki
1 and Ki
2 are applied to yi and to all yj 6= yi such that
yj ∈ I(gi), respectively, to take the expectation of τi,w h i l eKi
3 is applied to all yj ∈ I(gi)t o
take the expectation on the signals yh,f o ra l lh/ ∈ I(gi). Formally we have:
Ki
1 =
(ts + u +( |gi| − 2)(tn + un))ts − (tn + un)tn (|gi| − 1)




(ts + u +( |gi| − 2)(tn + un))tn − (tn + un)(ts +( |gi| − 2)tn)





(|gi| − 1)(tn + un)+ts + u
. (9)
The diﬀerence in ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt in the information structures g and g0 can be








where in (10) we have used the fact that the terms ai in the equilibrium strategies are the
same for all ﬁrms i and for all information structures.
3 Information Sharing in Common Value Games
We study the incentives to share information in common value situations (ts = tn)w h e n
sharing agreements are bilateral and exclusive. The main results in the literature for the
6case of exclusive agreements refers to the speciﬁc contract in which ﬁrms choose whether
to universally share information (the complete network in the present setting) or not to
share any (the empty network in the present setting). These results are well summarized by
Proposition 4.4 in Raith (1996), rephrased below in the terminology of this paper:
In a Common Value information sharing situation, the expected proﬁts of ﬁrms in the



















depending on the parameters of the model.
Note that ε is an index of products’ diﬀerentiation, and that when ε<0s t r a t e g i e s
are complements, while ε>0 is the case of strategic substitutes. So, complete pooling of
information is never proﬁtable when strategies are substitutes and products are homogeneous,
w h i l ei ti sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable when products are extremely diﬀerentiated and/or strategies are
complements.
In the present context of bilateral information sharing, we are not only interested in
comparing the complete and the empty networks, and we allow for any incomplete structure
where information sharing is partial. In order to identify equilibrium information structures,
we borrow a well known stability notion from the theory of strategic network formation. We
say that the network g is a pairwise stable information structure if it satisﬁes two conditions:
no ﬁrm has an incentive to sever one of its links in g and no pair of ﬁrms have an incentive
to add a new link to g.
Deﬁnition 1 The information structure g is pairwise stable if:
1) Eπi(g) ≥ Eπi(g − ij) for all ij ∈ g;
2) Eπi(g + ij) >E π i(g) → Eπj(g + ij) <E π j(g) for all ij / ∈ g.
Note that the empty network is not pairwise stable if there exists a pair of ﬁrms that
would be better oﬀ by mutually exchanging their private information. The next proposition
shows that such incentives may exist even when strategies are substitutes and products are
homogeneous, and always exist when the number of ﬁrms in large enough (the proof of all
results in the paper are found in the appendix).
Proposition 1 Consider a common value information sharing situation.
i) If µ<2





2 then there exists a p∗∗
n such that for all pn <p ∗∗
n the empty network
is never pairwise stable, for all values of n; otherwise (when pn >p ∗∗
n )t h e r ee x i s t saﬁnite
number of ﬁrms n∗ such that for all n>n ∗ the empty network is not pairwise stable.
iii) If µ> 2
1+
√
2 there exists p∗
n and a ﬁnite value n∗ such that for all pn >p ∗
n and n>n ∗
the empty network is not pairwise stable.
It is useful to discuss the forces behind propositions 1 and 2 comparing our results with
Raith’s (1996) results for the contractual model. Point i) covers those cases in which two
ﬁrms always have an incentive to share information when no other ﬁrm is in the market
(2
3 is in fact 2
n+1 for n =2 ) . P o i n ti) shows that these incentives remain when there are
more than two ﬁrms in the market. Points ii) and iii) cover situations in which two ﬁrms
may not have the incentive to share information when alone in the market. Point ii) shows
that when these incentives exist (low pn), they do not vanish as we add ﬁrms to the market.
More interestingly, when such incentives are absent when no other ﬁrms are in the market
(high pn), these incentives are shown to appear as we add more ﬁrms in the market. Finally,
point iii) refers to those problems in which two ﬁrms would never share information, for any
value of pn (these problems include the standard Cournot game with homogeneous products).
Here, it is shown that by adding ﬁrms in the market we can generate incentives for bilateral
information sharing, provided the correlation parameter pn is large enough.
Note that the threshold levels of µ is Raith’s paper are decreasing in n. Therefore, it is
not possible that by adding ﬁrms in the market we pass from a situation where the empty
graph dominates the complete graph to a situation where the opposite is true. In other words,
the results of points ii) and iii) show that incentives for bilateral information sharing exist
in problems where complete information pooling is not proﬁtable, and are responsible for the
instability of the empty network.
The mechanics underlying these results have been brieﬂy discussed in the introduction.
When two ﬁrms share information in a market where other ﬁrms exist, they not only obtain
ar e ﬁned information on the state of the world and the observation of the other ﬁrm’s signal,
but also obtain a reﬁned information on the signals observed by the other ﬁrms in the market,
through signals’ correlation. The larger the number of these ﬁrms, the larger the beneﬁts
for the two sharing ﬁrms in terms of expected proﬁts. Not surprisingly, at point iii),w h e r e
the dominance of the empty network on the complete network is more severe for n =2 ,o u r
result requires a suﬃciently large correlation of ﬁrms signals.
8Note ﬁnally how the number of ﬁrms in the market play opposite roles in the present
paper and in the previous literature. While in Raith’s paper a larger n enlarges the set of
problems in which the absence of information is proﬁtable with respect to an industry-wide
information sharing agreement, in the present paper a larger n increases the beneﬁts from
bilateral information sharing, making the empty network unstable.
Proposition 2 below provides an example in which information is shared in equilibrium
even with the minimal number of ﬁrms that is required to generate the beneﬁcial eﬀect
underlying the result of proposition 1. Proposition 2 also shows that equilibrium information
structures need not entail either the absence or the complete pooling of information, but may
disclose part of the information in the system to a subset of ﬁrms.
Proposition 2 There exist common value problems that admit an incomplete stable infor-
mation structure.
It is useful to sketch here the example used to prove Proposition 2 in the appendix. Firms
1a n d2ﬁnd it proﬁtable to share information (an example of proposition 1 at work in which
the required level of n is n∗ = 2), but neither have the incentive to form a link with 3, on
which they already acquired enough information through the link 12. The result is obtained
for a high level of signals’ errors’ correlation un, ensuring at the same time the incentives
to form the link 12 and not to form a link with ﬁrm 3. Firm 3 is actually excluded from
information sharing, since it would have an incentive to form a link with either 2 or 1.
Proposition 2 also implies that the complete network may not always be achieved though a
dynamic process of formation of bilateral agreements. However, in the example of proposition
2 the complete network is pairwise stable, since no ﬁrm has an incentive to sever one of its
links. The next ﬁnal proposition shows that this is a very general feature of all common value
situations.
Proposition 3 Let n ≥ 3. The complete network is always a pairwise stable information
structure.
We ﬁnally remark that the stability result of proposition 3, at least in its general form,
is very speciﬁc to the concept of pairwise stability, allowing only for one-link deviations.
A more sever requirement for stability would allow ﬁrms to sever all their links at a time,
withdrawing all their private information from all competitors. Although it can be checked
9that the complete network satisﬁes this stronger requirement in the example studied by
proposition 2, other instances of Cournot competition can be constructed in which it is not
so. In contrast, the results of both proposition 1 and 2 would carry over to this stronger
notion of stability.
4 Conclusions
We have studied information sharing in oligopoly when ﬁrms can make bilateral and exclusive
agreements. We have shown that some amount of information is always shared in equilibrium,
even in common value situations with strategic substitutes, for which the previous literature,
allowing only for an industry-wide agreement, has predicted the complete absence of infor-
mation sharing. We have also shown that it is possible to construct symmetric situations in
which some but not all information is shared in equilibrium, and some ﬁrms are excluded
from the group of information sharing ﬁrms. The implications for policy are quite relevant
and partly contrast with those inspired by previous works on the subject, since evidence of
information sharing need not be associated with collusive behaviour.
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APPENDIX
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 .
The proof is organized in several steps, and goes by studying the diﬀerence in expected
proﬁts of two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, in the empty networks g∅ a n di nt h en e t w o r kg12 ≡ {12}.
Denoting by a and b the coeﬃcients of equilibrium strategies in the empty network and by
a1 = a2, b11 = b12 = b21 = b22 the equilibrium coeﬃcients of ﬁrms 1 and 2 in the network
g12, we obtain:
a1 = a2 = a =
β




























3(n − 3 − 4K2
3 (n − 2))ε2.
From (10), we can express the diﬀerence in proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 (and, by symmetry, of ﬁrm
2) in g∅ and in g12 as the diﬀerence of the variances of equilibrium quantities:
Eπ(g∅) − Eπ(g12)=b2 (ts + u) − 2b2
11 (2ts + u + un). (11)
11Plugging in (11) the values of the K’s and the b’s coeﬃcients, denoting by pi =( ts + u)
and by pn =( ts + un) the variance and covariance of signals, and letting p ≡ pi + pn,w e










(4pipδ2 +2 p(pi +( n − 3)pn)δε− pn ((3n − 5)pn − (n − 3)pi)ε2)
2
#
It can be shown that the denominator of (12) is always strictly positive for all admissible
values of the parameters (a complete proof of this fact is available on request). The sign of
(11) is therefore the same as the sign of the numerator of (12). Dividing the numerator of
(12) by δ4 and denoting
ε
δ
by µ we obtain the following expression:
a · n2 + b · n + c (12)
where
a =( pi − pn)p2
nµ2 ¡
4pip(µ − 1) +
¡
p2




b =2 ( pi − pn)pnµ
¡
−8p2
ip +4 pip(2pi +3 pn)µ +2 pi (pi − 8pn)pµ2 − pn
¡
3p2








nµ2 ((44 − 21µ)µ − 36) + 4p4 (µ(4 + µ) − 4)
−4p3
ipn (µ − 1)(3µ(4 + µ) − 4) + p2
ip2
nµ(48 + µ(µ(32 + 9µ) − 76))
¤
We ﬁrst record the following two facts:
E1) setting n =2w eo b t a i n 3 that the sign of (12) is negative for µ<2




2 and in the intermediate range is positive if and only if pn >
pi
¡
4 − 4µ − µ2¢
2µ2 ≡ p∗∗
n .
E2) the roots (n−,n +) of (12) are real (since b2 −4ac ≥ 0), distinct and ﬁnite as long as
a 6=0 .
To continue the proof we need of the following lemmas:
Lemma 1 1) if µ< 2
1+
√
2 then (12) is concave. 2) if µ> 2
1+
√
2 then there exists p∗
n such
that for all pn >p ∗
n (12) is concave, otherwise it is convex.
3These are same stability conditions as in Raith (1996), proposition 4.4: in fact, for n =2 ,t h ef o r m a t i o n
of the link 12 is equivalent to complete pooling of information.
12P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Note that concavity of (12) depends on the sign of term a,t h a ti s
the same of the term:
¡
4pip(µ − 1) +
¡
p2





Let us evaluate the roots of this last term as a function of pn.W eﬁnd:
4pi (1 − µ)+5 piµ2 ± pi (µ − 2)
p
4(1− µ)+1 7 µ2
4µ2 (14)
The largest root yields a value which exceeds pi. We therefore consider only the smaller root
p∗
n, and conclude that if (13) is a convex function of pn,t h e na is negative for all pn >p ∗
n.
Since it can be easily checked that the second derivative of a with respect to pn has the same
sign as µ2, we conclude that a is negative for values of pn larger than the smaller root p∗
n.




n < 0, implying, by virtue of step above, that a<0f o r




n > 0 and increasing in µ.I nt h i sc a s e ,
a<0 for all values p∗
n <p n <p i. Consider again the smaller root in (14)
p∗
n =
4pi (1 − µ)+5 piµ2 + pi (µ − 2)
p
4(1− µ)+1 7 µ2
4µ2 . (15)













Computing the ﬁrst derivative of (15) with respect to µ we obtain a strictly positive value
for all µ in the range (0,1]. This implies that for all 0 <µ<µ + we have p∗
n < 0. Also, we
have that pi >p ∗
n > 0f o r1≥ µ>µ +. Finally we note that µ− is out of the allowed range
(− 1
n−1,1] of µ; moreover computing the ﬁrst derivative of (15) with respect to µ we obtain
a strictly negative value for all µ in the range (µ−,0).Then for all − 1
n−1 <µ<µ + we have
p∗
n < 0, that means a<0. QED
Lemma 2 Let n =2 .1 )I fµ>0,t h e r ee x i s t sˆ pn > 0 such that (12) is increasing in n if
pn < ˆ pn and µ> 2
1+
√
2, otherwise (12) is decreasing in n;2 )I fµ<0 then (12) is increasing
in n.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :The ﬁrst derivative of (12) at n =2i sg i v e nb y :
2(pi − pn)pnpµ(2pi − pnµ)
¡
pi (µ(4 + µ) − 4) − 2pnµ2¢
(17)
13The sign of (17) is the same as the sign of the following expression:
µ
¡
pi (µ(4 + µ) − 4) − 2pnµ2¢
(18)
The expression in brackets in (18) is positive for pn <
pi (µ(4 + µ) − 4)
2µ2 . It is directly




positive values for µ> 2
1+
√
2.T h er e s u l t sf o l l o w s .Q E D .
We are now ready to prove points i)-iii) of the proposition.
Point i) (µ<2
3 ). The proof of this part is organized in two steps.
Step 1. (µ<0). We know that at n = 2 (12) is negative (by E1) and increasing (by
Lemma 2); moreover we know that (12) is concave (by Lemma 1). These facts tell us that
the two real roots of (12) (n−,n +)a r el a r g e rt h a n2 .N o ww es h o wt h a t( n−,n +) are larger
than the admissible value of n for any µ<0.




We ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the smaller root n− and the maximum allowed value
of n is positive for all µ<0. It follows that (12) remains negative for all admissible values
of n, which means that the empty network is not pairwise stable.
Step 2. (0 <µ<2
3). We know that at n = 2 (12) is decreasing (Lemma 2); moreover
we know that (12) is concave (Lemma 1). This two facts tell us the all points n ≥ 2a r ei n
the right (and decreasing) branch of the (parabola) (12). By E1 we know that (12) takes
negative values at n =24; Therefore these evidences are enough to show that (12) remains





2). We know that at n = 2 (12) is decreasing (Lemma 2);
moreover we know that (12) is concave (Lemma 1). These two facts tell us the all points
n ≥ 2 are in the right (and decreasing) branch of the parabola given by (12). Now suppose
that (12) takes negative values at n =2 ; 5 the two real roots of (12) are strictly smaller than
2; it follows that (12) remains negative for all n ≥ 2. Now suppose that (12) takes positive
values at n =2 ; 6 the larger real root n+ must be larger than 2; it follows that, for all n>n +
(12) takes negative values.










2 and pn >
pi

4 − 4µ − µ
2
2µ2 .








2 and pn <
pi

4 − 4µ − µ
2
2µ2 .










2 and pn >
pi

4 − 4µ − µ
2
2µ2 .
14Point iii) (µ> 2
1+
√
2). By lemma 1 we know that (12) is concave if pn >p ∗
n,a n d
otherwise is convex; moreover we know that at n = 2 (12) is positive (by E1). Now suppose
(12) is concave (that is, pn >p ∗
n): the larger real root n+ must be larger than 2; it follows
that, for all n>n + (12) takes negative values. Now suppose (12) is convex (that is pn <p ∗
n);
by lemma 2 we know that at n = 2 the function (12) is increasing in n if pn < ˆ pn (note
that we ﬁnd that ˆ pn = p∗
n when µ = 2
1+
√





increasing in µ 7;i tf o l l o w st h a tp∗
n < ˆ pn so that we have pn <p ∗
n < ˆ pn). Therefore the two
real roots (n−,n +) must be smaller than 2 and the (12) takes positive values for n ≥ 2. ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2 . We develop a simple Cournot example in which three ﬁrms
are endowed with symmetric private information (same un and ui) and produce slightly
diﬀerentiated products (ε =0 .9) in a common market with demand uncertainty (γs =1 ) .
For simplicity we neglect costs, and we let αi(τi) = 0 for all i, βn =0a n dδ =1 .W ea l s os e t
ts = u = 1. We show that the network g∗ = {12} is pairwise stable.
We ﬁrst compute equilibrium strategies and expected proﬁts in g∗. The updating coeﬃ-

















The coeﬃcient of ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategies in the Bayesian game associated with g∗
are (see expressions (5)-(6):























¢2 − 2(2 + ε)
(22)
In order to evaluate the stability of the information structure g∗,w en e e dt oe v a l u a t et h e
equilibria and the expected proﬁts associated with the two networks g∅ (that originates by
7More precisely, the ﬁrst derivative of the expression
pi (µ(4 + µ) − 4)
2µ2 − pn is increasing in µ.
15severing the link 12 from g∗) and the network g0 = {12,23} (that originates by adding the








































































































4+4 ε +2 εK2











(2 − ε + ε2)
(34)




From (10), in order to compare ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts in these three structures we only
need to look at the variance of their equilibrium strategies (note, in fact, that the term a -
the intercept of the equilibrium strategy - is the same in all three networks and for all ﬁrms).
We obtain the following expressions:.
16Eπ1 (g∗)=Eπ2 (g∗)=2( 2 b11)
2 +2 b2



























11 (1 + un). (40)
We show that for high enough values of un (the correlation of the error term of ﬁrms’
signals), the network g∗ satisﬁes the following conditions and is therefore pairwise stable:











>E π 3 (g∗). (43)
Although the expressions of proﬁts are quite long and complex, the result can be easily
illustrated by means of three pictures.











Figure 1. Incentives to sever link 12.
This diﬀerence is negative for high enough values of un, meaning that for high enough
correlation of signals, ﬁrms 1 and 2 have no incentives to sever their link in g0. This result is
a speciﬁc case of proposition 2, in which the value of n which is suﬃcient to create incentives
to form a link starting from the empty network is n =3 .
17Figure 2 reports the diﬀerence Eπ2 (g0) − Eπ2 (g∗) as a function of un.





Figure 2. Incentive of ﬁrm 2 to form the link 23.
For high enough values of signals’ correlation, ﬁrm 2 has no incentives to form the link
23 starting from g∗. This result has an intuitive interpretation: when correlation among
signals is not too low, ﬁrms 1 and 2 are able to infer enough information on ﬁrm 3’s signal
by observing each other’s signals. It follows that neither ﬁrm is willing to disclose to agent
3 its own private information (that is, to form a link with 3) in order to obtain additional
information on ﬁrms 3’s signal. Note that ﬁrms 3 is actually excluded from the information
sharing group made of ﬁrms 1 and 2. In fact, it can be shown that condition (43) holds,
that is, that ﬁrm 3 would indeed be willing to link and form the link 23. This is illustrated
in Figure 3, reporting the diﬀerence Eπ3 (g∗) − Eπ3 (g0), which is positive for high enough
values of un.







Figure 3. Incentive of ﬁrm 3 to form the link 23.
This observations conclude the proof.¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3
The proof is organized in several steps, and goes by studying the diﬀerence in expected
proﬁts of two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, in the complete networks gc a n di nt h en e t w o r kg−12 ≡ {gc − 12}.
Denoting by a and b1 = bij for all i,j ∈ N the coeﬃcients of equilibrium strategies in the
complete network and by a1 = a2, b11 = b22,a n db13 = b1j = b23 = b2j for all j ∈ N/ 1,2t h e
equilibrium coeﬃcients of ﬁrms 1 and 2 in the network g−12 ,w eo b t a i n :
a1 = a2 = a =
β




2δ +( n − 1)ε
b11 = γs
K1

















(2δ +( n − 2)ε)K1






1 (n − 2)ε









From (10), we can express the diﬀerence Eπ(gc)−Eπ(g−12) in the proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 (and,
by symmetry, of ﬁrm 2) in gc and in g−12 as the diﬀerence of the variances of equilibrium
quantities, here given by the following expression:
n · b2
1 ((ts + u)+( n − 1)(ts + un)) −
¡
b2
11 +( n − 2)b2
13
¢
(ts + u) (44)
−(n − 2)b13 (2b11 +( n − 3)b13)(ts + un).
19Plugging in (44) the values of the K’s and the b’s coeﬃcients, denoting by pi =( ts + u)
and by pn =( ts + un) the variance and covariance of signals, and letting p ≡ pi + pn,w e




It can be shown that the denominator of the above equation is always strictly positive
for all admissible values of the parameters; moreover the sign is the same as the sign of the
following expression.
¡
4(pi +( n − 2)pn)
¡
δ2 +( n − 3)δε
¢
+( ( 7+( n − 6)n)pi +( n(19 + (n − 8)n) − 16)pn)ε2¢
(46)
We divide (46) in two terms. The ﬁrst, 4(pi +( n − 2)pn)
¡
δ2 +( n − 3)δε
¢
,i sa l w a y s :
indeed by assumption ε>− δ
n−1 and the proof follows directly; it can be directly veriﬁed
that the second term of (46) is positive for n ≥ 5. Therefore (46) could be negative only for
n =3a n dn =4 . B u tf o rn = 3 (46) becomes 4(pi + pn)δ2 − 2(pi +2 pn)ε2and for n =4




− (pi +4 pn)ε2 and, by the assumption that ε>− δ
n−1,
both terms are strictly positive.¥
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